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TAX LAW
I. TEST ADOPTED FOR EXEMPTING FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS
FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION
In Hibernian Society v. Thomas1 the South Carolina Court
of Appeals held that the Society's meeting hall was exempt from
ad valorem taxation under section 12-37-220B(12) 2 of the South
Carolina Code. The case is significant for the following two rea-
sons: (1) the court articulated a test to determine when a frater-
nal organization's property is tax exempt; and (2) the case noti-
fies practitioners of the possible sources of interest payments on
refunds of ad valorem taxes.
In 1979 and 1980 the Society paid, under protest, ad
valorem taxes on Hibernian Hall to both the city and the county
of Charleston.3 The Society then sued the city and county for
refunds of the taxes plus interest from the city. The trial court
held that Hibernian Hall was exempt from ad valorem taxation
under section 12-37-220B(12), 4 but did not require that the city
pay interest under section 12-47-2305 of the South Carolina
1. 282 S.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 339 (Ct. App. 1984).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220B(12)(Supp. 1984).
3. Record at 1. In 1979 the Society paid ad valorem taxes of $2,971.92 to the city
and $3,673.91 to the county; in 1980 the Society paid $3,176.88 to the city and $3,830.19
to the county.
4. The statute provides in pertinent part:
B. In addition to the exemptions provided in subsection A the following
classes of property shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation subject to the
provisions of § 12-3-145:
(12) The property of any fraternal society, corporation or association,
when the property is used primarily for the holding of its meetings and the
conduct of its business and no profit or benefit therefrom shall inure to the
benefit of any private stockholders or individuals.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220B(12)(Supp..1984).
5. The statute provides in pertinent part-
The remedies and rights.., for the payment of taxes under protest and
the recovery thereof shall apply equally to incorporated municipalities, with
respect to city or town taxes,. . . [and] if judgment be for the plaintiff... the
amount of taxes, with interest at six per cent from the date of payment, shall
be refunded to the plaintiff.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-47-230 (1976).
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Code.
The Society appealed the denial of interest, and the city
and county appealed the award of the refunds, arguing that the
Society had failed to meet the criteria for tax exemption under
section 12-37-220B(12). The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision on the refunds, but reversed the decision not to
require the city to pay interest. The Hibernian Society did not
argue on appeal that interest should also have been paid by the
county.6
In holding that Hibernian Hall was exempt from ad
valorem taxes, the court of appeals found that the criteria in
section 12-37-220B(12) had been satisfied: (1) the Society was a
fraternal organization; (2) Hibernian Hall was used primarily for
holding society meetings and conducting its business; and (3)
the members did not profit or benefit individually from the Soci-
ety's business.7
In holding that the Hibernian Society was a fraternal organ-
ization within the meaning of section 12-37-220B(12), the court
stated: "It was formed with the purpose. . . of engaging in char-
itable work which purpose presently exists."' Noting that the
hall was open 364 days a year for conducting the Society's busi-
ness and only intermittently rented out to nonmembers, the
court also found that the hall's primary purpose was its availa-
bility for Society meetings and the conduct of its business. 9 Fi-
nally, the court, applying logic rather than case law,10 deter-
mined that the Society's business neither profited nor benefited
the individual members. The court stated:
There is bound to be some incidental, non-financial benefit re-
sulting from membership in any type organization. In enacting
this particular condition, the legislature intended, we believe,
to stop the flow of any direct or indirect commercial benefits to
the individual members of the Society, . . . as opposed to the
benefits which inherently and customarily flow to the members
6. The argument does not appear in the Hibernian Society's appellate brief or in the
trial transcript.
7. 282 S.C. at 469, 319 S.E.2d at 342. See supra note 4.
8. Id. at 470, 319 S.E.2d at 342.
9. Id. at 471, 319 S.E.2d at 343.
10. In its discussion of inured benefits, the court of appeals cited only one case,
Harding Hosp. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974), and distinguished it from
the instant case.
[Vol. 37
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of a fraternal organization as a group."'
Since the court found that the Society met all three conditions
imposed by section 12-37-220B(12), the meeting hall was exempt
from ad valorem taxation, and the Society was entitled to re-
funds of the taxes paid under protest.
The key factor in the court's decision was its determination
that no member benefited individually from the projects or ben-
efits of the Society. The court of appeals based this finding on
two grounds. First, the court stated that any benefits resulting
from membership in the Society inured to the benefit of the
members as a group. Second, the court noted that although
some financial benefits inured to the group members, these fi-
nancial benefits simply were not substantial enough to violate
the no-profit condition of section 12-37-220B(12). 2 It thus ap-
pears that the court of appeals devised a two-part test for deter-
mining if any profit or benefit has inured to any individual
member. First, all the benefits must inure to the group, and sec-
ond, any financial benefits the membership may receive must be
insubstantial.
In ruling that the city was required to pay six percent inter-
est per annum on the tax refund, the court of appeals held that
the city lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute requiring the payment of interest.13 Section 12-47-230 re-
quires that a city, but not a county, pay six percent interest
when ordered by a court to refund ad valorem taxes. The city
challenged the statute on equal protection grounds, but the
court decided that the city lacked standing to raise the equal
protection issue.1 4 The court also determined that the city was
barred from contesting the constitutionality of section 12-47-230
since a city is a political subdivision of the state and, for pur-
poses of equal protection, could not challenge the constitutional-
ity of a statute effectively enacted by itself.
Counsel for the Hibernian Society failed to argue, and per-
haps for this reason the court of appeals failed to recognize, that
11. 282 S.C. at 471, 319 S.E.2d at 343 (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 471-72, 319 S.E.2d at 343.
13. Id. at 473, 319 S.E.2d at 344.
14. The court determined that the city was not a "person" within the meaning of
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3, which provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws." 282 S.C. at 472, 319 S.E.2d at 343-44.
19851
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section 12-47-60'5 of the South Carolina Code sometimes re-
quires a county to pay interest on ad valorem taxes refunded as
a result of litigation.
16
In Bowaters Carolina Corp. v. Smith17 the South Carolina
Supreme Court held:
The general supervisory powers conferred by the statutes upon
the Tax Commission with respect to assessment of property
taxation bring such taxes within the classification of those ad-
ministered by the Commission, within the meaning of Section
65-2656 ... and renders the county liable for interest on the
amount of the taxes recovered in this action.""8
Thus, the court ruled that ad valorem taxes are administered by
the South Carolina Tax Commission. While there are subtle dif-
ferences in the fact situations of Bowaters and Hibernian Soci-
ety, the language quoted above suggests that the Society could
have recovered interest from the county as well as the city.
Counsel's failure to argue for interest from the county under sec-
tion 12-47-60 may have cost the Society a substantial amount in
interest. 9
Hibernian Society v. Thomas sets forth a test to determine
when the property of fraternal organizations is exempt from ad
valorem taxation. Under this opinion, an insubstantial amount
of financial benefit may inure to the benefit of all the members
of a fraternal organization without threatening the tax exempt
status. Perhaps most importantly, this decision should alert at-
torneys that interest on ad valorem tax refunds may be obtained
15. S.C. CODe ANN. § 12-47-60 (1976).
16. That statute provides in pertinent part-
With respect to taxes... administered by the South Carolina Tax Com-
mission, whenever any amount of taxes ... are recovered by successful litiga-
tion in the courts of this State, such amounts recovered shall bear interest at
the rate of one half of one per cent per month from the date such taxes...
were paid ....
S.C. Code Ann. 12-47-60 (1976).
17. 257 S.C. 563, 186 S.E.2d 761 (1972).
18. 257 S.C. at 574, 186 S.E.2d at 765. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2656 (1962) is currently
S,C. CODE ANN. § 12-46-60 (1976).
19. The amount would have been six percent per annum of the taxes paid in 1979
and 1980, calculated from the last day of the tax year until the date of this decision. The
taxes paid were $3,673.91 for 1979 and $3,830.19 for 1980. Record at 1.
[Vol. 37
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from both the city and the county under the South Carolina
Code.
Michael G. Wimer
II. COMPUTER SOFTWARE SUBJECT TO STATE SALES AND USE
TAx
In Citizens and Southern Systems v. South Carolina Tax
Commission20 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
sale of magnetic tape computer software was a transfer of tangi-
ble personal property21 and, thus, subject to the state sales and
use tax.22 This decision aligns South Carolina with the minority
of states taxing computer software as tangible personal prop-
erty23 and solidifies the state Tax Commission's position that the
sale of such software is taxable.24
20. 280 S.C. 138, 311 S.E.2d 717 (1984).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-35-140 (1976) defines "tangible personal property" as "per-
sonal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt or touched or which is in any
other manner perceptible to the senses . .. ."
22. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-35-510 through -810 (1976). Section 12-35-510 imposes
"upon every person engaged or continuing within this state in the business of selling at
retail any tangible personal property whatsoever" a sales tax equal to a percentage of the
gross proceeds of the sales of the business. Section 12-35-810 provides for the imposition
of a tax on the "storage, use or other consumption in this State of tangible personal
property purchased at retail for storage, use or other consumption in this State . .. .
23. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Honeywell Information Sys. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 575 P.2d 801
(1977); First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Dep't of Revenue, 85 Ill. 2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175
(1981). But see Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464
A.2d 248 (1983); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments and Taxa-
tion, 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974); Maccabees Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep't of
Treasury, 122 Mich. App. 660, 332 N.W.2d 561 (1983); University Microfilms v. Scio
Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257 N.W.2d 265 (1977); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell,
538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166
(Tex. 1977); Statistical Tabulating Corp. v. Bullock, 538 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. 1976); First
Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Janesville
Data Center v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis. 2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656 (1978).
24. S.C. Tax Comm'n R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 117-174.262 (1976) states in
part:
The [sales and use] tax applies to total charges for coding, punching or
otherwise reproducing prewritten programs including charges for the tapes or
other properties when furnished by the seller or reproducer.
The temporary transfer of possession of a program for a consideration for
the purpose of direct use by the customer or to be reproduced by the customer
on or into tapes or other properties is a lease of tangible personal property
5
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In 1978 Citizens and Southern Systems (C & S Systems)
purchased a computer software program on magnetic tape. C &
S Systems then transferred the program from the magnetic tape
into its computer memory and returned the tape to the manu-
facturer. When the State Tax Commission assessed a sales and
use tax on the purchase, C & S Systems paid it under protest
and brought this action to recover the taxes plus interest. C & S
Systems argued that the sale was one of either intangible per-
sonal property or services, neither of which is subject to the sales
and use tax.25 The Tax Commission countered that the sale of
the magnetic tape software was subject to taxation because the
software met the statutory definition of tangible personal prop-
erty.26 The trial court ruled in favor of the Tax Commission.2 7
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision and found that the magnetic tape computer
software was tangible personal property subject to the state's
sales and use tax.28 The court rejected the theory that the tax
status of a computer program should be based on its ability to
be separated from the tape itself. Citing Comptroller of the
Treasury v. Equitable Trust,29 the court agreed that the "'[t]he
taxability of a sale of a canned program copy should not turn on
whether the buyer stores the program in memory.' "30 Thus, it
was of no consequence that C & S Systems transferred the pro-
gram into its computer and returned the magnetic tape to the
seller; the transaction was still one of tangible personal property.
C & S Systems also contended that the sale should not be
subject to taxation because the program could have been intro-
duced into its computer through a number of other, less tangible
means. The court, however, citing Chittenden Trust Co. v.
King,31 stated that the buyer is forced to "accept the conse-
quences of its choice to purchase the program in the form of a
magnetic tape . - 2 To hold otherwise would be to effect a
subject to the tax ....
25. Record at 17-19.
26. 280 S.C. at 140, 311 S.E.2d at 718.
27. Record at 59.
28. 280 S.C. at 141, 311 S.E.2d at 718.
29. 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983).
30. 280 S.C. at 141, 311 S.E.2d at 718 (quoting 296 Md. at 472, 464 A.2d at 255).
31. 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983).
32. 280 S.C. at 142, 311 S.E.2d at 719.
234 [Vol. 37
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tax system based on what could have occurred rather than what
actually took place.
The South Carolina Supreme Court modeled its decision
and reasoning on Chittenden, which also concerned the
purchase of a computer software program. Chittenden Trust Co.
maintained that since the "focus of the transaction" was knowl-
edge and information-an intangible-rather than the tape it-
self, the sales and use tax should not apply.3 3 The Chittenden
court indicated, however, that Vermont's statutory scheme did
not anticipate that the "essence of the transaction" test should
be applied in this context.34 This "essence of the transaction"
test has been used by several other courts in finding that the
transfer of magnetic tape computer software is intangible per-
sonal property.3 5 Although the South Carolina Supreme Court
mentioned several of these cases, it did not apply the test.
In Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell,36 the Tennessee Su-
preme Court, construing a similar statute,37 reached the opposite
result and determined that magnetic tape computer software is
intangible personal property. Noting that magnetic tapes are not
a crucial element of software programs because computer pro-
grams can be transmitted by alternate means without any tangi-
ble manifestations, the court found that the transfer of magnetic
tapes was only incidental to the actual purchase of intangible
knowledge, which remained in the computer. The court distin-
guished magnetic tapes from phonographic records on the basis
that a record is complete and ready to use when purchased,
33. 143 Vt. at 274, 465 A.2d at 1101.
34. Id., 465 A.2d at 1102. The Chittenden court rejected any distinction between the
magnetic tape and such taxable personal property as books and records based on the
inherent ability of the computer program to exist apart from the tangible tape. The
court held that the value of both "lies in their respective abilities to store and later
display or transmit their contents." Id.
35. See, e.g., State v. Central Computer Servs., 346 So. 2d 1156 (Ala. 1977); First
Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Dep't of Revenue, 85 Ill. 2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981);
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); Bullock v. Statistical
Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977); Janesville Data Center v. Wis. Dep't of
Revenue, 84 Wis. 2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656 (1978).
36. 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976).
37. "Tangible personal property" is statutorily defined in South Carolina, Tennes-
see, and Vermont as "personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt or
touched, or is in any other manner perceptible to the senses." S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-35-
140 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-102(17)(1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §
9701(7)(1981).
1985]
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while the magnetic tape computer program must be introduced
into and then translated by the computer. It is the final intangi-
ble knowledge remaining in the computer that is the subject of
the sale.3 8
Several courts have distinguished between canned computer
programs, which are ready to use when purchased, and custom-
ized computer software, which, although standardized to some
extent, requires more adaptation to suit the requirements of a
particular purchaser.3 9 When adaptations have been made to
suit a specific installation, a strong argument can be made that
the transaction is one of personalized services.40 It can also. be
argued, however, that an adaptation made to personalize a pro-
gram is not of sufficient magnitude to warrant classifying the
transaction as one of services for tax purposes.
41
Citizens and Southern Systems indicates to purchasers that
magnetic tape computer software will be subject to the state
sales and use tax. Those wishing to avoid the tax should
purchase computer software in other, less tangible forms, such
as via telephone transmission or manual loading into the com-
puter. It also serves as a warning that the South Carolina Su-
preme Court will strictly and literally apply the statutory defini-
tion of "tangible personal property" for the purpose of
determining tax status.
Judith L. McInnis
III. WHEN TAX REFUND SUIT IS PERMITTED WITHOUT PRIOR
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
In Greenville Baptist Association v. Greenville County
Treasurer,42 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that a
taxpayer whose property is denied tax exempt status by the
38. 538 S.W.2d at 408.
39. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Dep't of Revenue, 85 fI1. 2d 84, 421
N.E.2d 175 (1981); Maccabees Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep't of Treasury, 122 Mich.
App. 660, 332 N.W.2d 561 (1983).
40. Maccabees Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep't. of Treasury, 122 Mich. App. at
666, 332 N.W.2d at 563-64.
41. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust, 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248
(1983).
42. 281 S.C. 325, 315 S.E.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1984).
236 [Vol. 37
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South Carolina Tax Commission is not required to exhaust all
administrative remedies, including appeal to the Tax Board of
Review, before initiating an action in the court of common pleas
to recover taxes paid under protest.4 3 The court concluded that
only taxpayers challenging overvaluation of property are re-
quired to exhaust administrative remedies before initiating an
action to recover taxes paid under protest.
44
The appellant, Greenville Baptist Association, claimed an
exemption for two tracts of land pursuant to article X, section 3
of the South Carolina Constitution,46 which exempts property
owned by religious institutions from taxation. The South Caro-
lina Tax Commission determined that the property was not tax-
exempt.46 The appellant paid the taxes under protest and insti-
tuted an action to recover the taxes and have the property de-
clared tax-exempt. The respondent demurred on the ground
that the court lacked jurisdiction because the appellant had not
exhausted all its administrative remedies, including an appeal to
the Tax Board of Review. The trial court granted the demurrer,
but the court of appeals reversed and remanded.47
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals first examined
section 12-3-145(D) 4s of the South Carolina Code to determine
whether it is mandatory that a taxpayer appeal to the Tax
Board of Review before initiating an action to recover taxes paid
under protest. The court acknowledged the merit of respon-
dent's argument that "sound judicial policy favors a preliminary
sifting process . . . to prevent attempts to swamp the courts by
resort to them in the first instance,149 but noted that "tax stat-
utes cannot be extended by implication beyond clear import of
43. Id. at 327, 315 S.E.2d at 164.
44. Id. at 329, 315 S.E.2d at 165.
45. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 3(c) provides that the property of a church will be exempt
from ad valorem taxation.
46. The court noted that the South Carolina Tax Commission found that the prop-
erty was not "'actually occupied"' as required by S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-
220(A)(3)(1976). 281 S.C. at 327, 315 S.E.2d at 164.
47. 281 S.C. at 326-27, 315 S.E.2d at 164.
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-3-145(D)(Supp. 1984) provides: "In addition to any right of
appeal otherwise provided by law, any taxpayer may appeal from the decision of the
Commission to the Tax Board of Review for an interpretation of the Constitution or
state laws regarding his exemption status upon payment of his taxes under protest
49. 281 S.C. at 328, 315 S.E.2d at 165.
1985]
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the language used." 50 Since the language of section 12-3-145(D)
clearly states that appeal to the Tax Board of Review is an "ad-
ditional remedy rather than a mandatory step in the appeal pro-
cess,"'1 the court was "constrained to hold. . . that the judicial
policy of exhaustion of administrative remedies must give way in
face of legislative intent to the contrary as revealed in the clear
language of the statute.
'5 2
The court continued its analysis by examining the judicial
interpretations of section 12-47-220, which permits a taxpayer to
bring an action against the county treasurer or the Commission
in the court of common pleas to recover taxes paid under pro-
test.5 3 In addition, the court reviewed cases which have held that
the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies ap-
plied to section 12-47-220.5" These cases all entailed overvalua-
tion of property by assessing officers, which should be corrected
at an administrative level. Errors regarding the tax-exempt sta-
tus of property, however, constitute jurisdictional defects that
render the assessments entirely void and should be remedied by
bringing actions at law.55 To support its position, the court
50. Id. (citing Adams v. Burts, 245 S.C. 339, 140 S.E.2d 586 (1965)(court refused to
expand the meaning of a tax statute to infer legislative intent to discriminate against an
accrual basis taxpayer in favor of a cash basis taxpayer)).
51. 281 S.C. at 328, 315 S.E.2d at 165.
52. Id.
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-47-210 (1976) provides: "When the State or any county
charges or levies any tax whatsoever against any person. . ., the person. . . may, if he
conceives such taxes to be unjust or illegal for any cause, pay such taxes . . . under
protest . . . ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-47-220 (1976) provides: "Any person paying any
taxes under protest may at any time within thirty days after making such payment, but
not afterwards, bring an action against the county treasurer or the Commission ... for
the recovery thereof, . . . in the court of common pleas . . "
54. For cases holding that a taxpayer must exhaust all administrative remedies
before instituting an action under S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-47-220 (1976), see Columbia De-
velopers, Inc. v. Elliott, 269 S.C. 486, 238 S.E.2d 169 (1977); Newberry Mills, Inc. v.
Dawkins, 259 S.C. 7, 190 S.E.2d 503 (1972); Meredith v. Elliott, 247 S.C. 335, 147 S.E.2d
244 (1966); Owen Steel Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 281 S.C. 80, 313 S.E.2d 636 (Ct. App.
1984).
55. The court adopted the position set forth in Meredith v. Elliott, 247 S.C. 335, 147
S.E.2d 244 (1966), in which the taxpayer alleged that the assessor's appraisal of the
property was excessive. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the taxpayer was
required to exhaust the remedy of appeal to the Tax Commission before instituting an
action to recover the taxes paid under protest. The Meredith court emphasized the dif-
ference between instances when a party is aggrieved by overvaluation and must "resort
to the tribunal created by the State for the correction of errors in assessment" before
maintaining an action at law and instances when a jurisdictional defect exists rendering
10
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noted that prior to the enactment of section 12-3-145(D), appel-
late practice did not require a taxpayer whose property had been
denied tax-exempt status to exhaust administrative remedies
before bringing an action under section 12-47-220.56
Greenville Baptist Association v. Greenville County Trea-
surer permits a taxpayer whose property is denied exempt status
by the South Carolina Tax Commission to bring an action in the
court of common pleas without prior resort to the Tax Board of
Review and without having exhausted available. administrative
remedies. Practitioners, however, should be aware that circum-
vention of administrative remedies is permissible only after de-
nial of tax-exempt status, a jurisdictional defect, and not after a
mere error of judgment, such as overvaluation of property.
Bonnie M. Weisman
IV. THE "PUBLIC PURPOSE" ExEMPTION FOR STATE AGENCIES
LEASING PROPERTY TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
In South Carolina Public Service Authority v. Summers
57
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that certain real prop-
erty owned by the South Carolina Public Service Authority (the
Authority) was exempt from ad valorem property taxation. s
The court found that any private benefit conferred on the indi-
vidual lessees of the property was merely incidental to the pub-
lic purpose being served. In this decision the court continued its
recent trend of expanding the scope of "exclusivity" in public
purpose determinations.
5
9
an assessment "wholly void." Id. at 343-44, 147 S.E.2d at 248.
56. For cases illustrating this practice, see Bowaters Carolina Corp. v. Smith, 257
S.C. 563, 186 S.E.2d 761 (1972); Epworth Orphanage v. Wilson, 185 S.C. 243, 193 S.E.
644 (1937); Citadel Dev. Found. v. County of Greenville, 279 S.C. 443, 308 S.E.2d 797
(Ct. App. 1983).
57. 282 S.C. 148, 318 S.E.2d 113 (1984).
58. Much of the property in question was lakefront resort property surrounding
Lakes Marion and Moultrie that was leased to private individuals for residential and
commercial use. The remaining property was leased to the South Carolina Wildlife and
Marine Resources Department and the United States Fish and Wildlife Bureau. Brief of
Respondent at 8; 282 S.C. at 148, 318 S.E.2d at 113.
59. Other recent decisions holding that an exclusively public purpose existed, not-
withstanding a lease that conferred a private benefit, include the following: Charleston
County Aviation Auth. v. Wasson, 277 S.C. 480, 289 S.E.2d 416 (1982)(airport property
1985]
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The South Carolina Constitution specifically exempts from
ad valorem taxation any property owned by the state or its po-
litical subdivisions and used exclusively for public purposes.00
This provision was made applicable to the South Carolina Pub-
lic Service Authority through enabling legislation which specifi-
cally stated that the Authority serves a public purpose and,
therefore, is not required to pay taxes on property it acquires to
carry out its stated purpose.61 Despite this provision, the tax as-
sessors of several South Carolina counties assessed real property
taxes on land leased by the Authority to private individuals. The
Authority paid the taxes under protest and instituted this action
to recover them. 2 The trial court found that the property was
exempt from ad valorem taxation.
The appellants challenged this decision, arguing that be-
cause of the private benefit conferred upon the individual les-
sees, the property did not serve an exclusively public purpose;
thus, the Authority was not entitled to tax-exempt status. The
South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial
court's decision.6
The supreme court, considering both the enabling legisla-
tion64 and the South Carolina Constitution, 5 concluded that any
private benefit to the lessees was only incidental to the attain-
ment of the Authority's public purpose. Noting that "public pur-
pose" is not easily defined, the court stated that each case must
be decided on its own peculiar circumstances. 6 The court recog-
leased to private concessionaires served an exclusively public purpose); S.C. Farm Bu-
reau Mktg. Ass'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 278 S.C. 198, 293 S.E.2d 854 (1982)(grain
elevator leased to a private entity for profit served a public purpose).
60. S.C. CONsT. art. X, § 3 provides: "There shall be exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion: (a) all property of the State, counties, municipalities, school districts and other
political subdivisions, if the property is used exclusively for public purpose ......
61. Under S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-31-80 (1976), the Authority was created "primarily
for the purpose of developing the Cooper River, the Santee River, the Congaree River
and their tributaries upstream . . . ." This enabling legislation was held constitutional
in Clarke v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481 (1935).
62. The action was instituted pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-47-220 (1976), which
allows any person paying taxes under protest to bring an action against the county trea-
surer or the Commission.
63. 282 S.C. at 149-50, 318 S.E.2d at 113-114.
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-31-80 (1976). See supra note 61.
65. S.C. CONsT. art. X, § 3. See supra note 60.
66. 282 S.C. at 151, 318 S.E.2d at 114 (citing Byrd v. County of Florence, 281 S.C.
402, 315 S.E.2d 804 (1984)). In Byrd the court found a Florence County ordinance that
[Vol. 37
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nized, however, that reference to prior decisions can be useful in
deciding a particular case. 7 After reviewing a number of recent
decisions that considered the relationship between leasing prop-
erty and public purpose,68 the court concluded that in all the
cases holding that a particular lease transaction was tax exempt,
"the governmental agency involved had as its purpose an objec-
tive designed to promote 'the public health, safety, morals, gen-
eral welfare, security, prosperity [or] . . . contentment of all of
the inhabitants or residents or at least a substantial part
thereof.' "69 The court found that there is a "critical distinction
between the purpose for which the property [is] used and the
method of accomplishing that purpose.170 The Authority's pur-
pose was "to increase access to the lakes by the public";71 the
method used to accomplish this purpose was to lease land to pri-
vate individuals whose homes and commercial facilities would
attract visitors to the lakes. 2
It is well established that when property is owned by a mu-
nicipal or quasi-municipal corporation, such as the Authority,
authorized "the issuance of general obligation bonds for the acquisition and development
of an industrial park" to be unconstitutional because "the primary beneficiaries of the
proposed redevelopment would be private parties." Id. at 403-05, 315 S.E.2d at 805. For
a discussion of Byrd, see Constitutional Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 37
S.C.L. REv. 47, 47-52 (1985). In Caldwell v. McMillan, 224 S.C. 150, 158, 77 S.E.2d 798,
801 (1953), the court observed that public purpose is a fluid concept that changes with
time, place, economy, and countless other circumstances.
67. 282 S.C. at 151, 318 S.E.2d at 114-15.
68. State v. City of Columbia, 115 S.C. 168, 104 S.E. 337 (1920)(Columbia Opera
House held to serve a public purpose); Charleston County Aviation Auth. v. Wasson, 277
S.C. 480, 289 S.E.2d 416 (1982); S.C. Farm Bureau Iktg. Ass'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth.,
278 S.C. 198, 293 S.E.2d 854 (1982). In contrast to Charleston County Aviation Author-
ity, see Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. App. 864, 298
S.E.2d 544 (1983)(portion of airport property leased to an in-flight catering corp. was not
in active use for airport purposes and was, therefore, subject to taxation).
69. 282 S.C. at 152, 318 S.E.2d at 115 (quoting Anderson v. Baehr, 265 S.C. 153, 162,
217 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1975)). The Anderson court applied this public purpose standard to
determine whether the plaintiff's property was taken "without due process in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Id. at 158, 217 S.E.2d at
45.
70. 282 S.C. at 152, 318 S.E.2d at 115.
71. Id. at 153, 318 S.E.2d at 115.
72. Id. The court additionally found that the statutory language created a contract
between the Authority and its bondholders and held that U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10 and S.C.
CONsT. art. I, § 4 protected such language against repeal by a subsequent constitutional
amendment.
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tax exemption is the rule and taxation the exception."3 The
court's decision in this case, however, appears to stretch the thin
line that separates property serving a public purpose from prop-
erty conferring a purely private benefit on individual citizens.
7 4
Unless a substantial part of the public is affected, the public
benefit may be held negligible and speculative compared to the
benefit to the private individual.75 By leasing to private individ-
uals who can afford to build vacation homes, the Authority may
actually have been frustrating its stated purpose by limiting ac-
cess to much of the lakefront property to the lessees and their
invited guests.76 As the appellants observed, "The public has no
vested right to use the property and do so only upon compliance
with conditions prescribed by the lessee."7 On the other hand,
those portions of the property leased to commercial establish-
ments could possibly aid in the development of the property if
the commercial establishments were of the type that would in-
crease public access.
7s
73. Charleston County Aviation Auth. v. Wasson, 277 S.C. 480, 289 S.E.2d 416
(1982); County of Hanover v. Trustees of Randolph Macon College, 203 Va. 613, 125
S.E.2d 812 (1962); S.C. CONST. art. X, § 3.
74. In Charleston County Aviation Auth. v. Wasson, 277 S.C. 480, 487, 289 S.E.2d
416, 420 (1982), the court set forth a two-part test for determining when property is used
exclusively for a public purpose. The first step is to determine what the public purpose
is, and the second step is to determine if the private benefits are of such magnitude that
the public purpose served is merely incidental in comparison. The court recently added
two additional steps to its test in Byrd v. County of Florence, 281 S.C. 402, 315 S.E.2d
804 (1984). The third step is to determine the speculative nature of the project; the
fourth step is to "balance the probability that the public interest will be ultimately
served and to what degree." Id. at 407, 315 S.E.2d at 806.
75. Anderson v. Baehr, 265 S.C. 153, 163, 217 S.E.2d 43, 48 (1975). Similarly, the
North Carolina Supreme Court has held that property belonging to a redevelopment
commission served a public purpose despite the fact that rent was being collected, be-
cause a specific plan existed for the future redevelopment of the property. Redevelop-
ment Comm'n of High Point v. Guilford County, 274 N.C. 585, 164 S.E.2d 476 (1968).
76. The achievement of the public purpose appears to be only an incidental effect of
the lease when compared with the direct impact of the lease of public property by air-
lines and rental car agencies in Charleston County Aviation Auth. v. Wasson, 277 S.C.
480, 289 S.E.2d 416 (1982).
77. Brief of Appellants at 10. The lessees have virtual control over the portion of
property that they lease. The North Carolina Supreme Court found that the North Caro-
lina Forestry Foundation's property was not exempt from ad valorem taxes when leased
to a commercial paper company that had been contractually granted virtually complete
operational control over the forest. Appeal of North Carolina Forestry Found., 296 N.C.
330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979).
78. It is well-settled in South Carolina and other jurisdictions that "the mere fact
that benefits will accrue to private individuals or entities does not destroy public pur-
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Because of the varied uses of the Authority's property, the
public purpose question was an extremely close one. It appears,
however, that the ultimate benefit to the public may be insignifi-
cant in comparison to the benefits accruing to the individual les-
sees. Although this case appears to grant wide latitude in public
policy determinations, its holding should be narrowly inter-
preted and read in conjunction with the four-part test for public
purpose established in Byrd v. County of Florence.7 9 Because of
the flexibility in construing public purpose, each case will con-
tinue to be decided on the basis of its own circumstances.
Deborah E. Casey
pose." Bauer v. S.C. State Hous. Auth., 271 S.C. 219, 229, 246 S.E.2d 869, 874 (1978). See
also Redevelopment Comm'n of High Point v. Guilford County, 274 N.C. 585, 164 S.E.2d
476 (1968).
79. 282 S.C. 148, 318 S.E.2d 113 (1984). See supra note 66.
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